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Abstract — Information security is an important aspect of a 
successful business today. However, financial difficulties 
and budget cuts create a problem of selecting appropriate 
security measures and keeping networked systems up and 
running. Economic models proposed in the literature do not 
address the challenging problem of security countermeasure 
selection. We have made a classification of security models, 
which can be used to harden a system in a cost effective 
manner based on the methodologies used. In addition, we 
have specified the challenges of the simplified risk 
assessment approaches used in the economic models and 
have made recommendations how the challenges can be 
addressed in order to support decision makers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Today’s IT infrastructures, systems and applications 
are more integrated, dynamic and distributed. According 
to [1] we have reached the era where information is the 
key for business to thrive and never before, information 
has been so important. With the rapid development of 
Information Technologies (IT) and increased popularity to 
run business online, networked systems are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. As a result, 
attacks can influence the productivity, revenue and 
reputation. Thus, there is a need to know the possible 
chances of securing informational assets in the 
environment where the number of attacks and threats 
emerge rapidly [2]. The models developed recently are 
oriented towards better analysis and assessment of threats, 
risks, vulnerabilities and network security measures. But 
even with the presence of such models, security measures 
cannot always  protect assets from threats. This is because 
of a poor network assessment and inherent management 
weaknesses. Hence, the security risk can never be fully 
eliminated, because it cannot be predicted. Though, the 
security models today should be designed to help security 
administrators and decision makers to take effective 
decisions when a number of constraints is considered.  
Network risk assessment plays a crucial role in 
modern society and is one of the important processes of 
information security management. A risk management 
process is needed in order to identify, describe and analyse 
network vulnerabilities. The final goal of a standard risk 
assessment procedure is to make security specialists and 
managers aware of the possible risks, network state and to 
help them to adopt security measures effectively. 
However, to be cost-effective, a coherent, well structured 
and straight forward risk assessment procedure should 
include the relationships among vulnerabilities, threats 
and countermeasures. The common methodologies are 
ISO 27001, ISO 17799 and guidelines issues by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST 
SP800-30 [3, 4, 5].   
Usually two approaches can be used to assess systems 
for risks. One of them is a qualitative risk assessment 
approach. It uses modelling, visualization techniques to 
give an overview of the state a system holds, whilst 
quantitative approach tries to give a measure for risk. In 
recent literature, researches argue, that combining both 
approaches can be more beneficial than using these 
approaches separately [6].  
With the high increase of automated systems and tools, 
humans have gained an ability to visualise, design and 
model networked systems, their security states, connection 
paths and other security related factors. Modelling 
techniques have been receiving a great interest between 
researchers. In terms of modelling, attack trees, attack 
graphs and other visualization techniques, such as onion 
skin model, offer a goal-oriented perspective of multi-
stage attacks, help to estimate with the attack related costs, 
visualize dependencies between vulnerabilities and 
security measures [6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ]. Despite the advantages 
modelling techniques offer, they cannot be used for very 
large networks. The graphs are complex and hard to read. 
This paper investigates security models, which 
consider risk assessment approaches to be applied for 
threat modelling, network hardening and risk analysis. 
Furthermore, we discuss the challenges related with the 
cost effective selection of countermeasures as well as 
clearly define research gaps in the area of risk assessment. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In 
Section II, we present visualisation techniques, which 
often are applied for quantitative and qualitative risk 
assessment approach. In Section III we discuss security 
models, which apply risk assessment based methodologies 
to estimate risk. Section IV provides main challenges and 
 
limitations. In Section V we illustrate our research model 
which is used to address limitations in the field. Finally 
we conclude in Section VI. 
II. INCREASING NETWORK SECURITY BY APPLYING 
VISUALISATION TECHNIQUES 
A. Visualisation Techniques 
In order to identify and assess informational assets for 
threats, vulnerabilities and risks, and implement risk 
management practices to counteract them, it is necessary 
to have a clear picture of a state the network holds. 
Further to this, every security specialist can analyse the 
prospective adversaries and propose related security 
measures. With the complete picture, the risk and cost 
effective strategies can be used to make decisions, based 
not only on the expertise of the security specialist, but 
also based on data obtained through particular scenarios 
and examples [29]. 
Visualisation techniques can help to convert abstract 
data so that it can be more informative and easier to 
understand. The semantic analysis of information 
gathered from abstract data should provide knowledge 
that will support decision-makers in finding a solution on 
how systems should be protected. Being more practical, a 
graph which interconnects various aspects in a compact 
way is worth more than a long explanation.  
In general, visualisation techniques are widely applied 
to analyse network security level and predict attacks, 
risks and possible threats. These techniques are attack 
graphs and attack trees. Attack graphs can represent all 
potential vulnerabilities and potential attack paths an 
attacker can take in order to reach the target. Furthermore 
attack graphs act as a tool in finding critical paths in large 
networks based on the threats and vulnerabilities 
identified. However, initial attack graph for large size 
networks was complex and visually not clear due to 
number of attack paths. Later, by enhancing the 
visualisation of the graph and proposing monotonicity 
concept, attack graphs became more scalable [30]. As a 
result, the layout of an attack graph can be adjusted to 
represent the real enterprise network.  
Attack graphs are often applied for network hardening 
in order to effectively represent a prior knowledge about 
vulnerabilities, their dependencies and network 
connectivity. In a graph, each path is an exploit that can 
have undesirable impact on system (Figure 1a).  
Attack trees are often applied for quantitative risk 
assessment analysis, because of the simplified way of 
visualising network nodes, attacks and their 
dependencies. According to [29] the concept of a tree can 
be used to analyse and assess the attributes of a security 
system, e.g., a probability of an attack success, assess the 
risks and quantify the costs of possible damage and 
defence controls. In terms of quantitative risk assessment, 
a tree structure can help to quantify lowest cost security 
countermeasure and the total cost of an attack. 
For more information about visualisation techniques 
applied for network hardening, please refer to [10, 25, 
29]. 
 
Figure 1. Attack scenarios by applying attack graph (a), attack tree 
(b)[29]. 
 
III. SECURITY MODELS 
 
Security of information assets is a priority for most 
organisations today. Investments are made to harden the 
perimeter, network devices, software bugs and to increase 
user awareness, however, to distinguish whether the 
investment was cost effective is a challenging task.  
Researchers have developed a number of security 
models for valuating security investments and optimally 
investing into information security [11,12]. Differently 
from these models, the authors in [13, 21] have proposed 
a model which analyses optimal defence strategy as a 
finite game between an attacker and defender  
In overall, security models can be classified based on 
the methodologies used to optimally invest into computer 
security. We have specified the following:  Risk assessment models  Cost-benefit models  Game models  Multi-objective decision support models 
This research is financially supported by EPSRC 
All of these methodologies help to distinguish how much 
should be invested into computer security, what benefits 
an organisation would get from certain investment and 
optimal allocated resources, so an attacker would not 
have adverse effect on informational assets. 
A. Risk Assessment Models 
First, risk assessment is one of the risk management 
procedures, which mainly provide guidelines in order to 
identify vulnerabilities, threats and their dependencies. 
The final goal of the process is to let decision makers be 
aware of possible risks that should be reduced, transferred 
or taken.  
In general, risk assessment can be undertaken in two 
ways, by applying qualitative or/and quantitative analysis 
methods. Qualitative methods require a good knowledge 
in the areas of vulnerability assessment, threat analysis to 
correctly predict probabilities of various attacks and 
possible impacts on the assets [22]. Quantitative 
approaches offer mathematical methods for calculating 
risks, impacts and other relative cost factors.  
We have made a comparison of risk assessment 
models analysed in the literature to help evaluate IT 
security investments. Table I summarises the main 
characteristics of the methodologies which can be used to 
calculate Return on Investment (ROI), Return on Attack 
(ROA) or to estimate the risk value, based on the input 
data, i.e. value of assets, threat likelihood, vulnerability 
severity. 
The risk assessment models that result in lists of risks, 
ROI value or set of scenarios do not provide enough 
information to prioritize risks when multiple resource 
constraints are considered, e.g. budget or time constraints.  
Another drawback of the simplistic risk assessment 
models relates to their non applicability to the realistic 
case scenarios. Assessing risks of information security is a 
very difficult step, because the data on the likelihood and 
costs associated with the risk factors is often limited and 
constantly changing. Thus, multi-objective conditions 
should be considered within the quantitative risk 
assessment process to optimally invest into network 
security. 
B. Game Models 
Differently from the models covered above, authors in 
[13][21] have proposed a game-theoretic method for 
optimal network hardening, where the overall cost for a 
defender is reduced based on the algorithm proposed. 
Game theoretical analysis is useful for decision, 
modelling and control processes related to network 
security.  
An interaction between an attacker and a defender 
treated as a two-player stochastic game in which action 
sets, costs/reward functions and transition probabilities 
can be defined. By creating specific scenarios, a game 
theory provides information such as attacker’s goal, steps 
he or she will follow, what are the rewards for each of the 
players, what are the expenses or how are the resources 
utilised during an attack [25]. Furthermore, game-models 
can help to estimate optimal network hardening strategies 
used to defend the attack in advance. 
The main drawback of such theory lies in hypothetical 
assumptions, which may not be applicable in a real state 
of affairs.  The steps an attacker may take are only 
predictable, so the final resource allocation methodology 
for a defender may be misleading. 
TABLE I.  COMPARISON OF RISK ASSESSMENT MODELS 
Referen-
ces 
Risk Assessment Models 
Method Input Output 
[23] Quantitative 
Threats, 
Success/Failure 
data, Asset value 
Rik-
vulnerability 
mapping, 
Risk index 
[15] Quantitative Assets, Threats, Probabilities 
ALE, Risk 
value, Total 
Damage 
[2] 
Hidden 
Markov 
method 
(HMM) 
IDS alerts Threat index Risk index 
[7] Quantitative 
Asset values, 
Actual Threats, 
Potential Threats, 
Vulnerabilities, 
Frequency of 
threats 
Total Risk, 
Risk for host 
index 
[8] Quantitative 
Asset value, 
Relative ranking 
of vulnerabilities 
and threats 
Exposure factor 
(EF) 
ALE, ARO, SLE, 
Safeguard cost 
Return on 
Investment 
(ROI) 
[6] 
Qualitative 
and 
Quantitative 
An attack tree, 
SLE, ARO, ALE, 
EF, Safeguard 
cost, 
Cost of loss 
ROI, 
Return on 
Attack(ROA) 
[24] 
Quantitative 
and 
Qualitative 
Asset value, 
Severity of 
Vulnerability, 
Likelihood of an 
Attack, 
SLE, ALE, ARO 
Attack tree 
ROI 
 
C. Economic Models with the Cost-benefit Analysis  
Cost-benefit analysis looks into intangible 
costs/returns and addresses time perspective. The 
simplicity of the frameworks can give suitable investment 
solutions for low risk investments. However, these 
methods do not consider uncertainty and give misleading 
indications for long term investments. 
Arora et.al has proposed a risk management 
framework, which determines costs and benefits of 
information security solutions [14]. They evaluate 
investments based on the benefits each invested dollar of 
investment brings, as well as reduce expected loss or risk. 
Furthermore, a cost-benefit trade-off is identified in 
relation to risk based return on investment (RROI) rather 
than ROI. To calculate RROI, an incident risk is 
calculated first (Eq.1). To distinguish between how cost 
effective the security solution is and how it will affect the 
incident risk, authors have introduced a bypass rate, which 
is estimated based on the effectiveness of it to an incident 
type.  
 
The model is rather hypothetical than practical because of 
the challenges in estimating bypass rate of the security 
solution and obtaining true costs of lost productivity or 
other possible attack consequences. 
The cost-benefit analysis methodology proposed by 
Wei et.al  can be used to calculate the cost of detecting an 
intrusion and responding to it based on qualitative and 
quantitative risk management approaches. The overall 
goal of the methodology is to determine the trade-off 
between costs required to respond to the IDS events and 
benefits the investment brings. To calculate the total cost 
for the event the equation is as follows. 
 
  
 
From their model, a cost benefit trade-off is calculated 
and if the response cost is higher than the damage cost, 
IDS will not log an event; however, in case the response 
cost is lower than the damage cost, a response to an 
attack will be initiated. The model is not designed for real 
time intrusion detection and cost calculation is not 
effective for this case, however, this model can be used as 
a background for future developments. 
D. Multi-objective Decision Support Models 
Best security practice dictates that security 
requirements be based on risk assessment [17]. However, 
simplistic risk assessment that as a result lists risks based 
on the set of pre-defined scenarios do not provide 
sufficient information. Furthermore, when additional 
requirements are requested, such as time or budget 
constraints, these models cannot be applied.  
Multi-attribute analysis help decision makers evaluate 
alternatives when conflicting objectives must be 
considered and balanced. Once constructed, a multi-
attribute analysis framework also provides the basis from 
which decision makers can evaluate alternative risk-
mitigation strategies [17]. 
The approach to match vulnerabilities to security 
profiles and enabling organisations to choose a minimal 
cost security profile providing maximal vulnerability 
coverage was analysed in [26]. The idea behind their 
approach is that any given security technology addresses 
only specific vulnerabilities and could possibly create 
additional vulnerabilities, named residual vulnerabilities.  
The authors have made an assumption that if a known 
vulnerability is covered by a particular security 
technology, the risk of that vulnerability being exploited 
is uniform, which most probably in a real case scenario 
would not always be the truth, as the risk level depends 
upon the severity of the vulnerability and impact it 
possesses to a system. The multi-objective problem 
introduced is to minimise the residual vulnerabilities and 
cost of implementing security measures. The problem 
was simplified to a set-covering problem, solved using 
genetic algorithm (GA) adapted to the weighted sum 
fitness function (Eq. (3)). As an input, authors have used 
generic set of security policies capable of covering one or 
more generic vulnerabilities, previously proposed in [27]. 
 
 
 
Where α+β = 1 and α,β≤ 1 represent preferences of the 
organisation. First objective maximises the coverage of 
vulnerabilities, or in other words, minimises the weighted 
residual vulnerability. Second objective minimises the 
costs to the organisation.  
Based on the Butler’s initial multi-attribute 
assessment framework, a multi-objective optimal security 
hardening problem was formulated in [28]. The authors 
have modelled the system administrator’s decision 
problem as three optimisation problems on the attack tree 
model. The transformation of the problems has led to 
more cost-benefit solutions required by the decision 
maker. The multi-objective problem then is to find a 
vector of security measures which minimises the total 
security control cost and residual damage. To solve 
problems authors have used SGA and NSGA-II 
algorithms. From the results obtained by the NSGA-II, 
only few robust solutions with good balance between 
residual damage were obtained. The gaps in the Pareto 
front are signalling that authors have not considered 
dependencies between the security measures. This limits 
the ability to provide real life solutions when multiple 
objectives should be considered. 
IV. CHALLENGES 
Based on the state-of-the art work related to risk 
assessment approaches, when a decision maker has to 
consider a set of security countermeasures to be applied 
to increase the security and reduce the risk of possible 
losses, the main challenge is to combine conflicting 
factors into an analysis.  
From the discussed work, the factors such as cost, risk, 
threats, likelihood are widely used, however, the issue 
like how the risk management can help in defining the 
risk and ways to reduce it, has not been raised before. 
Currently, there is no particular model introduced in the 
literature, which would combine general risk  
Figure 2. Multi-objective risk assessment model 
flowchart. 
management factors into a multi-objective optimisation 
problem related to conflicting factors of cost and risk. 
Furthermore, in order to be able to answer the 
question, like “What risk can I accept” simplistic risk 
assessment models cannot be used. The following criteria 
should be considered:   Multiple objectives, which would compound 
cost related factors.   Be more practical.  Consider the impact on confidentiality, integrity, 
availability (CIA).  Use of tangible costs. 
 
Considering the factors mentioned above, the model 
could help in making cost-effective decisions. 
 
V. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the challenges covered above, we have 
designed a model which in a coherent, structured way 
applies risk assessment procedure and optimisation 
routine for efficient search of cost effective solutions for 
multi-objective security countermeasure selection 
problem.  
Figure 2 shows a flowchart of the research model we 
are working on, where input entries, relations and 
probabilities are used to formulate a multi-objective 
countermeasure selection problem and an optimisation 
function. Applying optimisation techniques, the process 
of selecting countermeasures can support with cost 
effective decisions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The importance of appropriate security models and 
risk management procedures in modern society is well 
understood. There has been an increased interest between 
the researchers to develop risk based models, which could 
help in dealing with the identification of threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks. Despite that, most of the models 
can only be used to compute effectiveness of investments 
in terms of calculating the ROI index or are limited by 
their applicability for real case scenarios.  
Visualisation techniques opened an ability to illustrate 
large data formats so that gained data would be used for 
knowledge and improved awareness between information 
system users. Furthermore, use of visualisation 
techniques helps in identification of threats in networked 
systems.  
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